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Abstract
We consider the extraction of shared secret key from correlations that are generated by
either a classical or quantum source. In the classical setting, two honest parties (Alice and Bob)
use public discussion and local randomness to distill secret key from some distribution pXYZ
that is shared with an unwanted eavesdropper (Eve). In the quantum settings, the correlations
pXYZ are delivered to the parties as either an incoherent mixture of orthogonal quantum states
or as coherent superposition of such states; in both cases, Alice and Bob use public discussion
and local quantum operations to distill secret key. While the power of quantum mechanics
increases Alice and Bob’s ability to generate shared randomness, it also equips Eve with a
greater arsenal of eavesdropping attacks. Therefore, it is not obvious who gains the greatest
advantage for distilling secret key when replacing a classical source with a quantum one.
In this paper we first demonstrate that the classical key rate is equivalent to the quantum
key rate when the correlations are generated incoherently in the quantum setting. For coher-
ent sources, we next show that the rates are incomparable, and in fact, their difference can be
arbitrarily large in either direction. However, we identify a large class of non-trivial distribu-
tions pXYZ that possess the following properties: (i) Eve’s advantage is always greater in the
quantum source than in its classical counterpart, and (ii) for the quantum entanglement shared
between Alice and Bob in the coherent source, the so-called entanglement cost/squashed en-
tanglement/relative entropy of entanglement can all be computed. With property (ii), we thus
present a rare instance in which the various entropic entanglement measures of a quantum
state can be explicitly calculated.
1 Introduction
When possessing a shared secret key, two parties can communicate over a public communication
channel in a provably secure manner. Specifically, by using the key for a one-time pad encryp-
tion, the public message can faithfully encode the secret message, thereby protecting it from any
eavesdropping third party. While it is impossible to establish secret key using public communica-
tion alone, it turns out that public communication can often be used to transform partially secret
key into a stronger, more usable form, a process known as secret key agreement or secret key distil-
lation [Mau93, AC93]. More precisely, suppose that the two parties (called Alice and Bob) share
correlated random variables X and Y, but an eavesdropper (called Eve) has partial knowledge
contained in her variable Z. Using public communication and local processing of their variables,
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Alice and Bob may be able to generate a highly correlated pair of variables (Xˆ, Yˆ) that is strongly
uncorrelated with both Z and the conducted public communication, i.e. secret key.
Typically one considers the scenario where Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to some source
that generates identical and independent copies of XYZ. The figure of merit then becomes the
secret key rate, which is the largest number of secret bits per copy that Alice and Bob can obtain
using local processing and public communication. Clearly if Z is highly correlated with either X
or Y, then it will be impossible for key to be generated, even in the many-copy setting. But it is
a significant open problem to understand precisely how Eve’s side information Z affects the key
rate.
There are a variety of physical situations in which one might encounter a many-copy source of
variables XYZ. Most notably is the task of quantum key distribution (QKD) in which the variables
XYZ are generated through the inherently stochastic nature of quantummeasurement [BB84]. Al-
ice, Bob, and Eve share a tripartite quantum state of the form |ΨyABE = řx,y,z eiϕxyzap(x, y, z)|xyzyABE,
where ϕxyz are arbitrary phases and p(x, y, z) describes a joint distribution for variables XYZ.
When the three parties measure their quantum system in the computational basis (i.e. in the
t|xyAu, t|yyBu, and t|zyEu basis respectively), their measurement outcomes are distributed accord-
ing to p(x, y, z). If this is done onmultiple copies of |ΨyABE, the parties thus generate a many-copy
source of XYZ from which Alice and Bob can distill secret key using public discussion and local
processing.
Note that the described scenario only describes one particular way that Alice and Bob could
use multiple copies of |ΨyABE to obtain key. With quantum mechanics, more physical operations
are allowed than just measuring in the computational basis. They could, for instance, put their
local subsystems through some quantum channel (i.e. a trace-preserving, completely positive
map), or they could each entangle their local subsystems and subject them to some joint unitary
evolution before measuring. Naively then, it appears that with such greater operational powers,
Alice and Bob can always distill at least as much key from a quantum source of |ΨyABE than from a
classical source of the underlying random variables XYZ. However, in the quantum scenario, Eve
also gains operational strength in her eavesdropping abilities. This begs the natural question: for
the purpose of secret key distillation, who gains the greatest advantage when embedding a given
distribution p(x, y, z) into a multi-party quantum system, the honest parties or the adversary?
Answering this question is the central aim of this paper. Through the construction of specific
examples, we show that the advantage can lie either with Alice/Bob or with the Eve. Hence the
adage “quantum is more powerful than classical” is really a matter of perspective when it comes
to the task of secret key distillation. Furthermore, we prove that quantum coherence plays the es-
sential role in affecting whether the quantum key rate differs from its classical counterpart. More
precisely, in the state |ΨyABE given above, the distribution p(x, y, z) is encoded as a coherent super-
position of the basis states |xyzyABE. An alternative form of quantum embedding is an incoherent
mixture of states ρABE =
ř
x,y,z p(x, y, z)|xyzyxxyz|. We prove that even when Alice and Bob are
allowed to perform arbitrary quantum processing on their respective parts of ρABE, their optimal
rate of key extraction is not improved over the corresponding classical key rate. This result is sig-
nificant as it identifies quantum coherence as precisely the ingredient that distinguishes classical
from quantum secret key distillation, something that has not previously been understood.
Our second main result involves computing the entanglement of a quantum state based on
the properties of its embedded classical distribution. Evaluating some of the most important en-
tanglement measures for a general quantum state is a notoriously difficult problem due to the
variational character of these measures. However, as we will demonstrate in this paper, when
embedding quantum states with certain types of probability distributions, the entanglement can
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be bounded by the secret key rate of the underlying distribution; and in some cases the two are
equivalent. This offers a remarkable demonstration of how cryptographic results in classical in-
formation can be used to uncover novel physical properties of quantum systems.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly summarize the main results of
the paper. We thenmove to Sec. 3 where a relatively self-contained overview of the necessary con-
cepts are present. In particular, we describe a unified framework for local information processing
and public communication in both classical and quantum key distillation protocols. Secret key
is presented as a classical analog to quantum entanglement, and the tasks of secret key distilla-
tion/formation are described as the counterparts to entanglement distillation/formation. While
still in Sec. 3, we define classes of probability distributions that possess special properties such as
the ability to dilute and compress secret correlations at equal rates. Main results and their proofs
are collected in Sec. 4.
2 Summary of Results
We now summarize our results in two tables. The first describes classical versus quantum key
rates KD. The underlying classical distribution is pXYZ and |Ψqqqy is its coherent embedding in a
tripartite state. When one or more of the parties dephases in the computational basis, it generates
a mixed state, and in this state we make the notational change q Ñ c for the corresponding parties
who dephase. Thus ρccc is a full incoherent mixture according to the classical distribution pXYZ.
For completion we note a result given by Christandl et. al who showed a distribution pXYZ for
which Eve being quantum gives her a definite increase in power KD(ρccc) ą KD(ρccq) [CEH+07].
Our second series of results involves analyzing the quantum versus classical rates for special
classes of distributions. Details of these classes are presented in Sect 3, and here we just state the
results. Most notably are the distributions possessing so-called secrecy reversibility, which can be
shown to have the following property related to quantum versus classical advantages.
Theorem 1. If a distribution pXYZ possess secrecy reversibility, then Alice and Bob can gain no advantage
over Eve when embedding their correlations into a quantum source (i.e. KD(pXYZ) ě KD(Ψqqq)).
It turns out that for a special subclass of reversible distributions, which also belong to the fam-
ily of so-called semi-unambiguous distributions, we are able to compute the quantum entangle-
ment in the embedded state. Specifically, the squashed entanglement (Esq), the relative entropy of
entanglement (Er), and the entanglement of formation (EF) can all be computed. This is remark-
able since all previous calculations of these measures for a given mixed state involve exploring
certain symmetries of the state (such as the so-called quantum flower states [CW05]). Our results
are obtained purely by relating entanglement to the classical problem of secrecy reversibility. Our
Rates Results Presented Here
KD(pXYZ) vs. KD(ρccc) KD(pXYZ) = KD(ρccc)
KD(pXYZ) vs. KD(Ψqqq) no general relationship
with arbitrarily large gaps existing in both directions
KD(ρccq) vs.
KD(ρcqq) vs. KD(ρccq) ď KD(ρcqq) ď KD(ρqqq)
KD(ρqqq) with arbitrarily large gaps existing between the rates
Table 1: Quantum Versus Classical Advantages in Secret Key Distillation.
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results are summarized in Table 2, where the quantity JXY|Z is the conditional common informa-
tion .
3 Preliminary
3.1 A Unified Framework for Local Information Processing and Public Communica-
tion
In this section we review the definitions of classical and quantum local operations and public
communication (LOPC).
3.1.1 Classical Operations.
In the classical LOPC setting, each party is allowed to perform the following operations:
(i) Generate local random variables that are uncorrelated from the variables held by any other
party.
(ii) Generate copies of any locally held variables.
(iii) Change the values of any locally held variables according to some function.
(iv) Broadcast the result of any computed function over an authenticated public channel.
Note that operations (i) - (iii) encompass any sort of noisy processing that a party may wish to per-
form. A general classical LOPC protocol Pc then consists of two phases: Phase I - a coordinated
andmulti-round exchange of public messages in which each message is a function of some party’s
local variables, and Phase II - each party processes his/her variables through a local channel cho-
sen according to the messages of Phase I, thereby generating the output variables of the protocol.
It is not difficult to see that the variables generated by any sequence of operations (i)–(iv) can
always also be generated by a protocol following this two-phase format [AC93, Mau93, CK11].
Consider now an arbitrary random variable G that is distributed according to pG over alphabet
G. Formally, we will represent G as a quantum state:
ωG =
ÿ
gPG
p(g)|gyxg|, (1)
Type of Distribution Results Presented Here
Secrecy Reversible
KD(pXYZ) ě Esq(ρAB)
Secrecy Reversible KD(pXYZ) ě EF(ρAB)
+ UBI-PD
Secrecy Reversible KC(pXYZ) = Esq(ρ
AB) = KD(Ψ
ABE) = KD(p
XYZ)
+ Semi-unambiguous
Secrecy Reversible KC(pXYZ) = EF(ρ
AB) = EC(ρ
AB) = Esq(ρAB) = Er(ρAB)
+UBI-PD = ED(ρ
AB) = KD(Ψ
ABE) = KD(pXYZ) = H(JXY|Z|Z)
+ Semi-Unambiguous
Table 2: Linking secret keys to quantum entanglement.
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where the |gy are orthonormal vectors for a vector space of dimension |G|. When ωG is subjected
to classical operations (i)–(iv), it will transform as
ωG
(i)ÝÑ ωG bωlocalS for local ancillary variable S;
ωG
(ii)ÝÑ
ÿ
gPG
p(g)|gyxg| b |gyxg|local;
ωG
(iii)ÝÑ
ÿ
gPG
p(g)| f (g)yx f (g)|local
ωG
(iv)ÝÑ
ÿ
gPG
p(g)|gyxg| b | f (g)yx f (g)|global . (2)
Here, ”local” (resp. “global”) refers to some system storing classical information which only one
party (resp. all parties) can access.
3.1.2 Quantum Operations.
In the quantum LOPC setting, each party is allowed to perform the following operations:
(i) Perform a local quantum instrument (Em)m [DL70], where each Em is a completely positive
(CP) map, and their sum
ř
m Em is a trace-preserving map. Quantum instruments represent
the most general type of quantum measurement. When performing the instrument on the
state σ, the “measurement” outcome m is obtained with probability p(m) = tr[Em(σ)], and
the post-measurement state given this outcome is σm = Em(σ)/p(m).
(ii) Broadcast the result of any quantum measurement.
A general quantum LOPC protocol Pq is described by a multi-level “tree” of local instruments
in which the choice of instrument performed at each node of the tree depends on the particular
history of measurement outcomes leading up to that node (see Ref. [KKB11, CH14, CLM+14] for
details). Transformations (i)–(iii) in Eq. (2) fall within the framework of local quantum instruments
since evaluating a function is a special type of quantum measurement in which the measurement
outcome is the function’s value. Therefore, quantum LOPC generalizes the notion of classical
LOPC.
With a slight abuse of notation, for a given classical/quantum protocol we usePc/Pq to denote
both the particular protocol as well as the map associated with the protocol:
P(σABE) =
ÿ
m
p(m)σABEm b |myxm|global,
where σABEm is the tripartite state generatedwhenm is the total broadcastedmeassage. The random
variable associated with the global communication is
ω
global
M =
ÿ
m
p(m)|myxm|global.
3.2 A Classical versus quantum source of correlations
Throughout this paper, wewill assume that some basis for Alice, Bob, and Eve’s systemhas chosen
and is fixed. Each of these is typically referred to as the computational basis for the given system and
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is denoted by t|xyAudAx=1, t|yyBudBy=1 and t|zyEudEz=1 respectively. Let pXYZ be an arbitrary three-way
joint probability distribution for random variables X, Y, and Z which takes on values p(x, y, z).
We introduce the following physical instantiations of pXYZ:
• A coherent embedding (or qqq embeding):
|Ψqqqy =
ÿ
x,y,z
eiϕxyz
b
p(x, y, z)|xyzyABE, (3)
for any ϕxyz P [0, 2π). (4)
• A one-sided incoherent embedding (or cqq embedding):
ρcqq =
ÿ
x
p(x)|xyxx|A b |ψxyxψx|BE, (5)
where |ψxy =
ÿ
y,z
eiϕxyz
b
p(y, z|x)|yzy.
• A two-sided incoherent embedding (or ccq embedding):
ρccq =
ÿ
x,y
p(x, y)|xyyxxy|AB b |ψxyyxψxy|E, (6)
where |ψxyy =
ÿ
z
eiϕxyz
b
p(z|xy)|zy.
• An incoherent embedding (or ccc embedding):
ρccc =
ÿ
x,y,z
p(x, y, z)|xyzyxxyz|ABE . (7)
Note that ρccc corresponds to the state ωXYZ introduced in Eq. (1). We can therefore think of ρccc as
either a classical or quantum object, the difference being dictated by whether it is processed using
either classical or quantum LOPC.
Regardless of how the phases φxyz are chosen, the various embeddings can be related through
a series of local physical transformations:
|ψqqqyxψqqq| (1)ÝÑ ρcqq (2)ÝÑ ρccq (3)ÝÑ ρccc, (8)
where (1) is attained by Alice performing a dephasing channel
σÑ
ÿ
x
|xyxx|σ|xyxx|
and likewise for (2) and (3). It is also worth pointing out that since we allow for phases φxyz
in the coherent superposition of Eq. (3), any tripartite pure state can be regarded as the qqq state of
some distribution. This distribution pXYZ is obtained simply by all three parties dephasing in the
computational basis as shown in Eq. (8). Our approach is thus more general to previous studies
in coherent embeddings [CEH+07], where it is typically assumed that φxyz = 0 for all x, y, and z.
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3.2.1 Secret Key Distillation.
The scenario we consider is an identical, independent, and discrete (i.i.d.) source that is generating
some particular embedding of pXYZ for Alice, Bob and Eve. The goal of Alice and Bob is to distill
secret key, which is shared randomness held independently of Eve’s system. We denote the state
corresponding to r := log s bits of perfectly shared randomness by
Φ
AB
r =
1
s
sÿ
i=1
|ssyxss|AB . (9)
The notion of secret key rate is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For distribution pXYZ, we say that R is an LOPC achievable key rate if for every
ǫ ą 0, there exists a classical LOPC protocol Pc acting on σABE := ρbnccc (for n sufficiently large) and
generating messages ω
global
M such that›››Pc(σAB)´ΦABtnR´ǫu b (ωglobalM b σE)›››1 ă ǫ, (10)
where σAB = trEσ
ABE and σE = trABσ
ABE. The supremum achievable key rate is denoted by
KD(pXYZ). We say that R is a ccc, ccq, cqq, or qqq LOPC achievable rate if there exists a quantum
LOPC protocol Pq to replace Pc in Eq. (10), and we further take σ
ABE := ρbnccc , σABE := ρbnccq ,
σABE := ρbncqq or σABE := |ψqqqyxψqqq|bn respectively. The supremum achievable key rates in these
scenarios are denoted by KD(ρccc), KD(ρccq), KD(ρcqq) and KD(ψqqq) respectively.
3.3 Quantum Entanglement
Quantum entanglement is a resource shared between two or more quantum systems that is dis-
tinct from secret key [HHHH09]. Starting from a tripartite pure state |Ψqqqy, Alice and Bob share
one entangled bit (ebit) of quantum information in the state |Ψqqqy if it has the form
|ΨqqqyABE = |Φ2yAB b |ϕyE, (11)
where |Φ2yAB :=
?
1/2(|00y+ |11y)AB is a so-called ebit and |ϕyE = řz eiϕz ˆa
p(z)|zy is any state held by Eve. On the surface, the tripartite state |ΨqqqyABE = |Φ2yAB b |ϕyE
looks very similar to the state ρABEccq = Φ
AB
2 b |ϕyxϕ|E, which contains one bit distillable secret
key and is obtained from |ΨqqqyABE through dephasing by Alice and Bob. However there is a
critical difference between the two states. For ΦAB2 b |ϕyxϕ|E, it is entirely consistent that there
should exist some third party Sapna (S) who holds as side information the value of Alice and
Bob’s bit in ΦAB2 . In other words, we can envision a four-party state σ
ABES = ΦABS3 b |ϕyxϕ|E with
Φ
ABS
3 =
1
2(|000yx000| + |111yx111|). And while KD(σABE) = 1, there is no secrecy with respect
to Sapna: KD(σ
ABS) = 0. In contrast, Alice and Bob’s entanglement in |ΨABEy exists regardless
of what side information is known. That is, if trES(σ
ABES) = |Φ2yxΦ2|AB for any state σABES,
then necessarily σABES has the product-state form σABES = |Φ2yxΦ2|AB b σES. This means that if
Alice and Bob should dephase when holding the state σABES, they will generate key that is secret
from not only Eve but also Sapna: |Φ2yxΦ2|AB b σES Ñ ΦAB2 b σES. Therefore, entanglement is a
property of a bipartite ρAB itself and, unlike secret key, one does not need to introduce any third
party to speak of its entanglement.
Similar to the secret key rate KD, one can also define for ρ
AB the entanglement distillation rate
ED [Rai99]. This quantifies the asymptotic rate for which ebits can be obtained from ρ
AB using
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local operations and classical communication (LOCC). The operational class LOCC differs from
quantum LOPC in that the former makes no explicit reference to a third party who records the
“public” communication. It is a fundamental and challenging problem in quantum information
to compute ED(ρ
AB) for a given quantum state. Almost all meaningful measures of entanglement
provide an upper bound for ED [HHHO09], and three such measures are the relative entropy
of entanglement [VP98], the squashed entanglement [CW04], and the entanglement of formation
[BDSW96]:
• Er(ρAB): the relative entropy of entanglement is
Er(ρ
AB) = min
σPS
S(ρ}|σ), (12)
where S is the set of separable density operators and S(ρ||σ) = ´tr[ρ log σ] ´ S(ρ) is the
relative entropy;
• Esq(ρAB): the squashed entanglement is
Esq(ρ
AB) =
1
2
inf
ρABE
I(A : B|E)ρABE , (13)
where the infimum is taken over all extensions ρABE such that TrE ρ
ABE = ρAB, and I(A :
B|E)ρABE = S(AE)+ S(BE)´S(ABE)´S(E) is the conditional quantummutual information
of the state ρABE.
• EF(ρ
AB): the entanglement of formation is
EF(ρ
AB) = min
ÿ
i
p(i)S(TrA ϕi), (14)
with the minimization taken over all decompositions ρAB =
ř
i p(i)|ϕiyxϕi|.
The particular significance of these entanglement measures is that they provide upper bounds not
only for the distillable entanglement but also for distillable key.
Theorem 2 ([HHHO05, HHHO09, Chr06]). For an arbitrary tripartite state |ΨqqqyABE with
ρAB = trE|ΨqqqyxΨqqq|ABE, the rates KD(Ψqqq) and ED(ρAB) are both upper bounded by the relative
entropy of entanglement Er(ρAB) as well as the squashed entanglement Esq(ρAB).
Unfortunately, each of the above entanglement measures involves a complicated minimiza-
tion and in fact, their evaluation represents an NP-hard/NP-complete computational problem
[Hua14]. It is therefore not surprising that very few instances are known in which any of these
measures can be explicitly computed. In this paper, we introduce a new class of quantum states for
which all these measures can be evaluated. Our strategy will be based on the notion of reversible
secrecy, which we describe next.
3.4 Reversible Entanglement and Secret Key
Dual to the task of entanglement distillation is the task of entanglement formation, which de-
scribes building a given state ρAB using LOCC and an initial supply of ebits. The entanglement
cost EC of a mixed state ρ
AB is the asymptotic optimal rate of ebit consumption for Alice and Bob
to generate faithful copies of ρAB by LOCC [HHT01]. The entanglement cost is obviously lower
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bounded by the distillable entanglement, and compared to the above entanglement measures, the
following hierarchy holds [HHHO09]:#
ED(ρ
AB)
KD(Ψqqq)
ď
#
Er(ρAB)
Esq(ρAB)
ď EC(ρAB) ď EF(ρAB), (15)
where the first inequality references Theorem 2. A state ρAB is said to possess reversible entan-
glement entanglement if ED(ρ
AB) = EC(ρ
AB). Operationally this means that the entanglement in
ρAB can be concentrated and diluted at equal rates.
Recently, the phenomenon of reversible secrecy, which is the classical analog to reversible
entanglement, was studied in [CFH15a]. Here, one first identifies the key cost KC of a distribution
pXYZ as the amount of secret correlations needed for Alice and Bob to asymptotically prepare pXYZ
using classical LOPC [RW03]. The distribution is said to possess reversible secrecy if KD(pXYZ) =
KC(pXYZ). A key result that we prove in Theorem 6 is that when pXYZ is a reversible distribution
and |Ψqqqy is a qqq embedding, then Eq. (15) can be further upper bounded as#
ED(ρ
AB)
KD(Ψqqq)
ď
#
Er(ρAB)
Esq(ρAB)
ď EC(ρAB) ď EF(ρAB) ď KD(pXYZ). (16)
By identifying a class of distributions in Section 3.5 for which KD(Ψqqq) = KD(pXYZ), this chain of
inequalities becomes tight and we are thus able to compute the various entanglement measures of
ρAB.
3.5 Classes of Classical Distributions Related to Secrecy Reversibility
For a tripartite distribution pXYZ, we can define maximal conditional common function JXY|Z =
tJXY|Z=z : pZ(z) ą 0u, where JXY|Z=z is the common information of a bipartite distribution
PXYZ(x, y|Z = z) [GK73]. For completeness, we provide a self-contained introduction of JXY|Z
in Appendix 6.1.
A distribution pXYZ is said to be ([CFH15b, CFH15a]):
• Block independent (BI) if I(X : Y|JXY|ZZ) = 0.
• Uniformblock independent (UBI) if both I(X : Y|JXY|ZZ) = 0 and H(JXY|Z|X) = H(JXY|Z|Y) =
0.
• Uniform block independent under public discussion (UBI-PD) if it is BI and there is a
public communication protocol generating messages M such that p(MX)(MY)(ZM) is UBI and
I(M : JXY|Z|Z) = 0.
• Uniform block independent under public discussion and eavesdropper’s local process-
ing (UBI-PDÓ) if there exists a channel Z|Z such that pXY|Z is UBI with the required public
communication M also satisfying I(Z : JXY|Z|MZ) = 0.
• Semi-unambiguous [CEH+07] if H(Z|XY) = 0.
• Unambiguous [OSS14] if H(Z|XY) = 0 and H(XY|JXY|ZZ) = 0.
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UBI
UBI-PD
BI
UBI-PDÓ
Semi-unambiguous
Figure 1: The relations between known classical distributions.
The relations between these distributions are depicted in Figure 1.
Being BI means that given Z, Alice and Bob share no more correlations besides their block
number given by some maximal common function JXY|Z. For UBI distributions, the block number
is independent of Z and can therefore be computed locally by Alice and Bob. Finally, for UBI-
PD, the distribution becomes UBI once Alice shares with Bob her and Eve’s common information,
and Bob does likewise. Of course, Eve learns nothing new about XY through this public discus-
sion. For semi-unambiguous distributions, the random variable Z can be uniquely determined
by random variables X and Y; while for unambiguous distributions, each random variable can be
uniquely determined by the other two random variables.
The significance of these distributions to the problem of secrecy reversibility is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([CFH15a]). (1) If KC(pXYZ) = KD(pXYZ) then there exists a channel for Eve Z|Z such that
pXYZ is BI. (2) If pXYZ is UBI-PDÓ, then KC(pXYZ) = KD(pXYZ).
In Ref. [CFH15a], it is shown that the necessary condition (1) and sufficient condition (2) are
equivalent whenever either Alice or Bob holds a binary random variable.
4 Main Results and Proofs
4.1 Advantages in Quantum versus Classical Key Distillation
4.1.1 No advantages in incoherent embeddings.
Theorem 4. KD(pXYZ) = KD(ρccc) for any distribution pXYZ.
Proof. The inequality KD(ρccc) ě KD(pXYZ) is immediate from the fact every classical protocol Pc
is a special type of quantum protocol Pq. Now we turn to the converse KD(ρccc) ě KD(pXYZ). The
ideawill be to show that every quantumLOPCprotocolPq distilling secret key can be transformed
into a classical protocol Pc that distills the same amount of key. Suppose that ||Pq(ρbnccc )´ΦABs b
(ω
global
M b σE)|| ă ǫ with σE = trAB(ρbnccc ) and Pq some r-round quantum LOPC protocol. To
perform the following analysis let’s fix some notation. First, without loss of generality, let’s assume
that r is even with Alice (resp. Bob) measuring in all the odd-numbered (resp. even-numbered)
rounds. We let iďk denote a particular sequence of the first k rounds with iăk := iďk´1. If we wish
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to refer to a specific outcome in the kth round, we will denote this by ik. Hence iďk = (i1, i2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ik)
for some particular sequence. Finally, if, say, Alice is the measuring party in the kth round, we
denote her local instrument conditioned on outcome iăk by (A
(iăk)
ik
)ik . If we wish to speak of the
full composition of Alice’s CP maps corresponding to the outcome sequence iďk, we will denote
this simply by A(iďk), with no subscript. That is (for odd-numbered k) we have
A(iďk) = A
(iăk)
ik
˝A(iďk´2) = A(iăk)ik ˝A
(iăk´2)
ik´2
˝ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˝Ai1 ,
and similarly Bob’s action is described by
B(iďk´1) = B
(iăk´1)
ik´1
˝B(iďk´3) = B(iăk´1)ik´1 ˝B
(iăk´3)
iăk´3
˝ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˝B(i1)i2 .
With the notation in hand, when performing protocol Pq on ρ
bn
ccc , we can describe the overall
state of generated across all outcome branches by
Pq(ρ
bn
ccc )
=
ÿ
x,y,z
ÿ
iďr
pn(x, y, z) A(iďr´1) b B(iďr)(|xyyxxy|)b |zyxz|E b |iďryxiďr|global, (17)
where the first sum is over X n ˆ Yn ˆ Zn with pn(x, y, z) being the n-fold product distribu-
tion of pXYZ, and the second sum is over all possible measurement sequences. If Alice and de-
phase Pq(ρbnccc ) in the computational basis, the resulting state will be at least ǫ-close to ΦABs b
(ω
global
M b σE) by monotonicity of the trace norm. Hence it suffices to show that this dephased
state ∆
(
Pq(ρccc)
)
can be generated using classical LOPC. To see that this is possible, we repeat-
edly use the fact that the messages are generated locally to form the expansion
∆
(
Pq(ρ
bn
ccc )
)
=
ÿ
x1,y1
ÿ
x,y,z
ÿ
iďr
Pr[x1, y1|iďr , x, y, z]pn(x, y, z)
¨ |x1y1yxx1y1|AB b |zyxz|E b |iďryxiďr|global (18)
where
Pr[x1, y1|iďr, x, y, z] = xx
1|A(iďr´1)(|xyxx|)|x1y ¨ xy1|B(iďr)(|yyxy|)|y1y
Pr[iďr|x, y, z] (19)
and
Pr[iďr|x, y, z] = tr[A(iďr´1) b B(iďr)(|xyyxxy|)]
=
rź
even k
tr[A(iďk´1) b B(iďk)(|xyyxxy|)]
tr[A(iďk´1) b B(iďk´2)(|xyyxxy|]
ˆ
rź
odd k
tr[A(iďk) bB(iďk´1)(|xyyxxy|)]
tr[A(iďk´2) b B(iďk´1)(|xyyxxy|]
=
rź
even k
tr[B(iďk)(|yyxy|)]
tr[B(iďk´2)(|yyxy|] ˆ
rź
odd k
tr[A(iďk)(|xyxx|)]
tr[A(iďk´2)(|xyxx|] . (20)
Thus a classical protocol Pc generating ∆(Pq(ρbnccc )) is the following:
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1. In the first round, Alice measures her variable x and broadcasts message i1 with probability
Pr[i1|x] = tr[Ai1 (|xyxx|)].
2. In every subsequent even-numbered (resp. odd-numbered) round k, Bob (resp. Alice) con-
sults the message history iăk and broadcasts ik with probability
Pr[ik|iăk, y] =
tr[B
(iăk)
ik
˝B(iďk´2)(|yyxy|)]
tr[B(iďk´2)(|yyxy|)] (21)
(
resp. Pr[ik|iăk, x] =
tr[A
(iăk)
ik
˝A(iďk´2)(|xyxx|)]
tr[A(iďk´2)(|xyxx|)]
)
. (22)
3. At the end of r rounds with the total message iďr having been generated, Alice and Bob
process their variables using local channels x Ñ x1 and y Ñ y1 with transition probabilities
given by
Pr[x1|iďr , x] = xx
1|A(iďr´1)(|xyxx|)|x1y
tr[A(iďr´1)(|xyxx|)] , (23)
Pr[y1|iďr , y] = xy
1|B(iďr)(|yyxy|)|y1y
tr[B(iďr)(|yyxy|)] . (24)
4. It can be seen that the state generated through this process is precisely ∆(Pq(ρbnccc )).
4.1.2 Arbitrarily large advantages in coherent embeddings.
Theorem 5. For any N, a distribution pXYZ exists that such that when embedding pXYZ into a coherent
quantum source, one of the following relationships holds:
(a) Eve gains an arbitrarily large advantage: KD(pXYZ)´ KD(ΨABEqqq ) ą N, or
(b) Alice and Bob gain an arbitrarily large advantage: KD(Ψ
ABE
qqq )´ KD(pXYZ) ą N.
Remark. In the proof of (a) we actually demonstrate a much stronger result that KD(pXYZ) ´
EF(ρ
AB) ą N. This means that we can distill key from pXYZ from a considerably higher rate
than the rate of entanglement needed to generate the corresponding quantum state ρAB. To our
knowledge, this is the first known result of its kind.
Proof. (a)We consider a very simple binary distributionwith p(0, 0, 0) = p(1, 1, 0) = 1/4, p(0, 0, 1) =
λ/2, and p(1, 1, 1) = (1´ λ)/2. This is a UBI distribution and by Theorem 3 below, its key rate
precisely KD(pxyz) = [1+ h(λ)]/2, where h(x) = ´x log x´ (1´ x) log(1´ x). The corresponding
qqq embedding has the form
|ΨABEqqq y =
a
1/2[|ΦyAB|0yE + (
?
λ|00y+
?
1´ λ|11y)AB|1yE].
Since ρAB is a two-qubit state, its entanglement of formation can be calculated using the celebrated
concurrence formula [Woo98] (see also [CFH15a]), and it is found to be
EF(ρ
AB) = h

[1+
d
1´
(
1+
b
λ(1´ λ)
)2
)]/2

 .
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A simple convexity argument shows that KD(pXYZ) ą EF(ρAB) whenever 0 ă λ ă 1/2. We now
consider n copies of pXYZ. Inspection reveals that p
bn
XYZ is also UBI for any n. Thus, KD(pXYZ) =
n[1+ h(λ)]/2. On the other hand, the entanglement of formation is a sub-additive quantity such
that EF
(
(ρAB)bn
) ď nEF(ρAB). Consequently, for any 0 ă λ ă 1/2 we attain an arbitrarily large
gap between KD(p
n
XYZ) and EF
(
(ρAB)bn
)
. By Theorem 2 and the fact that EF(ρ
AB ě Esq(ρAB), this
gap will be at least as large as the gap between KD(p
n
XYZ) and KD
(
(ΨABEqqq )
bn
)
.
(b) Consider the state |ΨyABE = ?1/2(|00y+ |1+y)AB|0yE where Eve is initially uncorrelated.
This is a qqq encoding of a distribution pXYZ = pXY ¨ qZ whose mutual information is I(X : Y) =
1´ h(1/3) « .311. Since Eve has no side information, the classical secret key rate KD(pXYZ) is
equal to the mutual information, a well-known result in secret key agreement [Mau93, AC93]. On
the entanglement side, the reduced-state entropy characterizes the entanglement distillation rate
for pure states [BBPS96]; hence S(ρB) = ED(Ψ
ABE). One bit of entanglement can be converted into
one bit of secret key, and thus KD(Ψ
ABE) ě S(ρB). In fact, this inequality is tight since S(ρB) =
Esq(ΨAB) ě KD(ΨABE). Because both the mutual information and von Neumann entropy are
additive, a similar argument to part (a) shows that the gap between S(
(
ρB
)bn
)´KD(pXYZ) can be
made arbitrarily large.
4.1.3 Advantages in one-sided versus two-sided coherent embeddings.
From Theorem 4, we see that the presence of quantum coherence is necessary for there to be a
difference in quantum and classical key distillation. The next example extends this result to states
in which only one of the subsystems has quantum coherence.
Lemma 1. There exists states for which
KD(Ψqqq) ą KD(ρcqq) ą KD(ρccq).
In fact, the gaps between these rates can be arbitrarily large.
Proof. Consider the qqq embedded state
|Ψqqqy = 1?
6
(
[|00y+ |11y]b |0y+ [|+ 2y+ | ´ 3y]b |1y+ [|2+y+ |3´y]b |2y
)
(25)
where |˘y = 1?
2
(|0y ˘ |1y). The two dephased states of interest are given by
ρcqq =
1
3
Φ
AB
2 b |0yx0|E +
1
6
(|0yx0|+ |1yx1|)A b (|2yx2|+ |3yx3|)B b |1yx1|E
+
1
6
(|2+yx2+ |+ |3´yx3´ |)AB b |2yx2|E, (26)
ρccq =
1
3
Φ
AB
2 b |0yx0|E +
1
6
(|0yx0|+ |1yx1|)A b (|2yx2|+ |3yx3|)B b |1yx1|,
+
1
6
(|2yx2|+ |3yx3|)A b (|0yx0|+ |1yx1|)B b |2yx2|E. (27)
From the squashed entanglement upper bound on KD, we find that KD(Ψqqq) ď 1, KD(ρcqq) ď
2/3, and KD(ρccq) ď 1/3. In fact, each of these bounds are tight using the following protocol.
For instance, with the state |Ψqqqy, Alice and Bob both perform a projection into the t|0y, |1yu or
t|2y, |3yu subspace. If one of them indeed projects into t|2y, |3yu, then the other party dephases in
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the t|+y, |´yu basis. Finally, a local unitary rotation is made back to the t|0y, |1yu basis for both
parties. Doing so generates the state ΦAB2 b (|0yx0|+ |1yx1|+ |2yx2|)E/3. For ρcqq a similar protocol
is performed except that no key is obtained when Bob projects into the t|2y, |3yu subspace (which
occurs with probability 1/3). And for ρccq, secret key is obtained with probability 1/3 when both
parties projection into the t|0y, |1yu subspace. Note that for n copies, the upper bounds become
KD(Ψ
bn
qqq) ě n, KD(ρbncqq) ě 2/3n, and KD(ρbnccq) ě 1/3n, which again are all tight. So by considering
many copies, we obtain exampleswhere the gap between the different key rates is arbitrarily large.
4.2 Embedding Distributions with Reversible Secrecy
We now consider qqq embeddings of distributions with reversible secrecy, for which it turns out
that the quantum embedding favours Eve over Alice and Bob. When addingUBI-PD and/or semi-
unambiguous structure, relationships between key and quantum entanglement can be drawn.
Theorem 6. (a) If pXYZ has reversible secrecy (i.e. KC(pXYZ) = KD(pXYZ)), then
KD(pXYZ) ě Esq(ρAB). (28)
(b) If pXYZ is UBI-PD (and hence reversible), then
KD(pXYZ) ě EF(ρAB). (29)
(c) If pXYZ has reversible secrecy and is semi-unambiguous, then
KC(pXYZ) = Esq(ρ
AB) = KD(Ψ
ABE) = KD(pXYZ). (30)
(d) If pXYZ has reversible secrecy, is semi-unambiguous and UBI-PD, then
KC(pXYZ) = KD(pXYZ) = KD(Ψ
ABE) = EF(ρ
AB)
= EC(ρ
AB) = ED(ρ
AB) = Er(ρ
AB) = Esq(ρ
AB) = H(JXY|Z|Z).
Proof. (a) By Theorem 3, if pXYZ is reversible then there must be a channel Z|Z such that pXYZ is
block independent. In other words, there exists a decomposition
pXY|Z(x, y|z) =
ÿ
jz
p(x|jz, z)p(y|jz , z)p(jz|z) (31)
where pX(¨|jz, z) and pX(¨|j1z, z) are disjoint distributions for jz ­= j1z, and likewise for Bob’s condi-
tional distributions. For each z, define the local measurement channel acting on Alice’s system
ω ÞÑ Ω(z)A (ω) :=
ÿ
jz
ÿ
x such that
p(x|jz,z)ą0
xx|ω|xy|jzyxjz|. (32)
Let Ω
(z)
B be defined similarly for Bob’s system.
We next consider the decomposition |ΨABEy =
ř
z
a
p(z)|ϕzy|zy, in which xxy|ϕzy =
a
p(x, y|z)eiϕxyz .
Note that ρAB = trZσ
ABZ where
σABZ :=
ÿ
z
ÿ
z
p(z|z)p(z)|ϕzyxϕz| b |zyxz| =
ÿ
z
p(z)σAB(z) b |zyxz|. (33)
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On the state σABZ, we first dephase in the computational basis, and then apply Ω
(z)
A bΩ
(z)
B condi-
tioned on z. Doing so generates the state
pσABZ :=ÿ
z
p(z)
ÿ
x,y
p(x, y|z)Ω(z)A (|xyxx|)bΩ
(z)
B (|yyxy|) b |zyxz|
=
ÿ
z
p(z)
ÿ
jz
p(jz|z)|jz jzzyxjz jzz|. (34)
Hence,
Esq(ρAB) ď 12
ÿ
z
p(z)I(A : B)σAB
(z)
ď 12
ÿ
z
p(z)[S(σA(z)) + S(σ
B
(z))]
ď 12
ÿ
z
p(z)[S(pσA(z)) + S(pσB(z))]
=
ÿ
z
p(z)H(JZ|Z = z)
= KD(pXYZ). (35)
(b) If pXYZ is UBI-PD then again by Theorem 3, we have KC(pXYZ) = KD(pXYZ) = H(JXY|Z|Z).
Eq. (33) still holds in this case with Z = Z, and σABZ is obtained from |ΨABEy by Eve dephasing in
the computational basis. Block-independence of pXYZ means that S(trA|ϕzyxϕz|) = H(JXY|Z|Z =
z). Since tp(z), |ϕzyu provides a pure-state ensemble realizing ρAB, we see that H(JXY|Z|Z) ě
EF(ρ
AB).
(c) From Theorem 2 and Ref. [CEH+07], semi-unambiguous distributions are shown to satisfy
the inequality Esq(ρAB) ě KD(ΨABEqqq ) ě KD(pXYZ). Combining with part (a) gives the desired
result.
(d) This follows from combining (c), (d) and Theorem 2with the fact that EF(ρ
AB) ě EC(ρAB) ě
maxtEr(ρAB), Esq(ρAB)u.
Remark. While Theorem 6 (a) implies that Alice and Bob never gain an advantage over Eve when
embedding their correlations into a quantum source, it is not difficult to construct distributions in
which Eve gains a non-zero advantage in the quantum setting. This can be seen by the chain of
inequalities in Eq. (35). In particular, whenever σABz is not pure the inequality will be strict. This
will hold, for instance, for any distribution pXYZ with a non-trivial channel Z|Z such that pXYZ is
UBI-PD.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the task of resource distillation in quantum and classical sources.
Since secret key can be distilled from both quantum and classical states, a direct comparison can
be made between the two scenarios. Quantum states that are diagonal in some fixed basis - such as
ρccc of Eq. (7) - lack coherence and are typically referred to as “classical” states since they possess
the same entropic properties as classical probability distributions. However, as quantum objects,
these states can undergo certain physical transformations that are impossible for classical states.
We have shown that despite this enhanced dynamical ability, secret key distillation is equivalent
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for a classical distribution and its incoherent quantum embedding. The situation is much differ-
ent when the embedding takes the form of a coherent superposition. We have presented examples
when quantum and classical key rates can be vastly different; sometimes it benefits Alice and
Bob to have their correlations embedded in a quantum state, sometimes it benefits Eve. We have
linked this investigation of quantum advantages to the problem of LOPC secrecy reversibility. By
introducing different families of distributions that demonstrate secrecy reversibility, we are able to
compute the entanglement and distillable key of the embedded quantum states. It is quite beauti-
ful that notoriously difficult entanglement measures can be computed using exclusively a classical
analysis of the states’s underlying probability distribution. We hope this paper helps advance our
understanding of the relationship between classical secrecy and quantum entanglement.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Common Information
Let X and Y be random variables over finite sets X and Y respectively, with joint distribution pXY.
A common partitioning of length t for X and Y are pairs of subsets (Xi,Yi)
t
i=1 such that
(i) Xi XXj = Yi XYj = H for i ­= j,
(ii) p(Xi|Yj) = p(Yi|Xj) = δij, and
(iii) if (x, y) P Xi ˆYi for some i, then pX(x)pY(y) ą 0.
For every common partitioning, we associate a random variable J(X,Y) such that J(x, y) = i if
(x, y) P Xi ˆ Yi. Note that each party can determine the value of J from their local information,
and it is therefore called a common function of X and Y [GK73]. We will refer to the sets Xi ˆ Yi
as the blocks of the given partitioning, and hence J is the “block number” random variable for the
particular common partitioning.
Amaximal common partitioning is a common partitioning of greatest length.
Proposition 1. Every pair of finite random variables X and Y has a unique maximal common partitioning.
With Proposition 1, we can speak unambiguously of themaximal common partitioning of two
random variables X and Y. We let JXY denote a maximal common function associated with the
maximal common partitioning of XY; i.e. JXY(x, y) is the number i for which (x, y) P XiˆYi in the
partitioning. Since JXY is determined entirely from either X or Y, with a slight abuse of notation
we will sometimes write JXY(x) (resp. JXY(y)) if we wish JXY to denote a function of x (resp. y).
Note that JXY is unique up to a relabeling of the blocks Xi ˆYi. The entropic quantity H(JXY)was
identified by Ga´cs and Ko¨rner as the common information of X and Y [GK73].
We now turn to the conditional form of common functions. For distribution pXYZ, the variable
JXY|Z is called amaximal conditional common function if JXY|Z=z is a maximal common function
of the conditional distribution pXY|Z=z. Explicitly, we have JXY|Z(x, y, z) = j if (x, y) P Xj ˆ Yj
for some fixed block labeling of the maximal common partitioning of pXY|Z=z. Again, note that
JXY|Z is unique for the distribution pXYZ up to the choice of block labeling for each conditional
distribution pXY|Z=z. For the case when Alice and Bob are perfectly correlated (or when there is
just one party), we also define JX|Z := JXX|Z.
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